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Abstract. In this paper, we disambiguate risky activity corporate users
are propagating with their software in real time by creating an enter-
prise security visualization solution for system administrators. The cur-
rent problem in this domain is the lag in cyber intelligence that inhibits
preventative security measure execution. This is partially due to the
overemphasis of network activity, which is a nonfinite dataset and is
difficult to comprehensively ingest with analytics. We address these con-
cerns by elaborating on the beta of a software called “Insight” created by
Felix Security. The overall solution leverages endpoint data along with
preexisting whitelist/blacklist designations to unambiguously communi-
cate potential Indicators of Compromise (IOC) on an executive level by
employing visualizations.
1 Introduction
To present clearly is synonymous with presenting in black and white. Enterprise
security may have attempted to borrow from this concept by defining Whitelist
programs, programs that are essential for operation and verifiably safe; and
Blacklist programs, programs that are either known to be malicious or indicative
of unsanctioned activity in the workplace [4]. The concern with this approach
is that every uncategorized program ends up in a grey area, causing the line
between white and black to become more of a nebulous cloud of uncertainty
with each node denoting a possible IOC. The purpose of this study is to delve
deeply into categorization of these programs by using a software called “Insight”
to determine any and all possible insights that can be extorted from the dataset
it generates to not only satisfy cybersecurity ends, but also general workplace
analytics.
The common premise between Whitelists and Blacklists is that you are in-
ventorying programs that are known, even though there is no singular inventory
of all the programs that currently exist. Whitelisting and blacklisting are used
in all areas of computing, not just software, and when it comes to user Access
Control Lists (ACL’s), it makes sense to only whitelist a small subse [1]t. How-
ever, cross-applying this philosophy to an enterprise’s ability to access software
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can inadvertently make a company less agile and delimit its ability to compete
and stay profitable by excluding newer low-cost programs.
The Insight program ameliorates the infinitely regressive data issue by taking
advantage of the fact that the number of programs that run on a machine is finite.
Specifically, Insight is a program that analyzes how much compute resources
are consumed by an endpoint over time. This visualizes the peaks and troughs
for workloads processed by the endpoint. The visualization of this data helps
Business Users and System Administrators understand the amount of resources
(excessive / sufficient / insufficient) which has been allocated to the workloads
on the physical or virtual machine. By utilizing the Insight program, we access
and log the process name, host name, owner name, and IP address every handful
of seconds that a computer is running. Amassing a dataset that contains each
program that runs on a machine, multiplied by the number of endpoints that
exist in even a small corporation could quickly become caustic and overwhelming.
Prior to aggregation, one month’s of raw data for a single user can easily result
in 18 million records totaling almost 2 gigabytes in size. These transactional
runtime logs that we are leveraging have always existed on machines, since the
advent of the computing age, but have remained underutilized. If Big Data is a
problem, this is the Original Sin.
We did not approach this solution as a way of creating a conclusive index of
what is good and bad, but rather leveraging preexisting lists that a corporation
has already curated and tailored to their specific needs and then extracting the
most promising gauges of the cyber health of an enterprise. This solution doesn’t
sell complexity, which is what you already have with that dense unstructured
dataset that was too nauseating to ever think about diving into. Insight sells
simplicity, and more importantly accessibility. Our first solution is the use of
visualization to emote the dataset and inspire action only when it is necessary
and provide assurances when everything is just fine. The mentality behind this
can be synonymized with soaking rice you had in storage. Only the grains that
have been compromised by weevils float to the top to be addressed and skimmed
while all the acceptable kernels rest unfettered at the bottom of the pan.
Subsequently, we append the utility of this program to go beyond just cyber-
security. IP addresses can be used to determine where an employee is working
and if he is performing unauthorized work from an immigration perspective in a
geographic location that he does not have a legal work permit in. The metadata
and coupling of like processes can be used as a way for an employee to have a
solid rebuttal that his vague misunderstood program actually has utility. This
would be useful in many companies that are still running a DOS backbone
and where the use of new and upcoming program like R is bizarre and foreign
in their IT culture. Lastly the time stamp data can be leveraged for workforce
planning, to understand if employees are performing work during working hours,
if non-exempt employees are performing work during non-working hours, and for
picking apart whitelist data to see if what an actual utilization of an employee
is by each specific job role, since job roles in technical environments are often
identified by programs that are used.
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Our result is an amended version of our Insight beta which created five visu-
alization sub-products that were affectionately named based on their appearance
for easy reference. A visual walkthrough is presented at the end of this study,
but to itemize them briefly: the first diagram allows the system administrator to
get to know their users, by their program consumption. The second shows the
admin the entire enterprise ecosystem by what their programs are classified as.
The third diagram negotiates liability between the first and second visualization
by ranking which users create the most risk. The last two diagrams are workforce
planning related as they analyze users based on the time and locations they are
working in. Our conclusions do not state a result specific to the data that was
used to create the visualization, but rather create a tool in which a security
professional can quickly get an overview of their endpoint ecosystem, provide a
symptom checker for risks in real time, and provide a medium to discover their
own conclusions.
The course of this study first defines what the Insight program entailed in its
beta form we received it and the intent of the program. Since the program heavily
utilizes the designation of software as either whitelist or blacklist, we discuss the
history and potential concerns of whitelisting and blacklisting fundamentals. We
then emphasize the need for our solution by itemizing the cost of a breach.
As always, when profitability and cost saving measures for a corporation are
addressed, the ethical ramifications of action must be weighed, which occurs in
section 5. To determine the uniqueness of our solution, we discuss preexisting
similar work in the sixth section. Sections 7 through 10 breakdown the process of
creating our solution in the following order: gathering data, baselining our data,
simulation of the endpoint, and the creation of Insight ’s data pipeline. Section
11 details Insight ’s resulting portfolio of five visualization to tackle enterprise
security and workplace analytics concerns. We then discuss our visualization
theory behind our results. There is then an analysis of the Insight program,
post completion. Lastly we enumerate our conclusions we reached during the
finalization of the Insight solution.
2 The Insight Program
Each workload on a physical or virtual machine is comprised of compute re-
sources. We create metadata for these compute resources and then by analyzing
them, it is possble to identify rogue and malicious processes. Using built in data
science analytics, Business Users and Security Analysts obtain an insight into
“unusual activity” occurring within their workloads. Furthermore, Security An-
alysts are able to create simple lists of “good and expected activity” and “bad
malicious activity”. The “good activity” is noted but ignored in the data analyt-
ics so as not to taint the data presented and the “bad activity” is identified and
ignored so the Security Analyst is aware of its presence and can them prevent it
using various security technologies. The remaining data, which is neither ‘good”
or “bad”, are presented as possible indicators of compromise.
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The initial version of the software we received, which has thus far been re-
ferred to as the “beta”, was a program we received from Felix Security and
could install on individual machines of our choosing to harvest data. The pro-
gram came with a predesignated list of whitelist and blacklist programs to model
what a generic company would deem as good or bad. Once installed, the pro-
gram sends a pulse at a short increment of seconds to record every program that
was running on the machine at the time, its CPU utilization, the total CPU
usage of all programs, the date, the time, the hostname, IP address, the user
within the machine, and its black/whitelist designation. With only these eight
vectors, we were instantly able see interesting aspects of our own usage by just
running summary statistics. For example, we were both in a Master’s program
and working full-time during the initial installation, and were surprised by the
range of unusual hours we were active on our computers. We also noticed that
there was a large portion of programs that were not initiated by our own user
accounts, but rather some variant of a “system” user. As an attacker, this would
be a great place to start hiding malicious programs that would have low promise
of discovery without a tool like the Insight beta to call attention to them.
However novel these discoveries were, the output from the beta was still a
very large table that was not user friendly to navigate with limited statistical
experience for a single user, much less an enterprise of endpoints. Also, even with
our vast lists of black and white programs, there was still a large portion of pro-
grams that were not designated as either, but rather as IOC. Insight specifically
lists these programs as indicators of compromise to accentuate the infinitesimal
effect of a whitelists or a blacklists when a majority of programs that are used
are largely unknown.
Our intent for this study was to finish the Insight program by automating
the wrangling the data from the beta, finding relevant data sets to append it to,
then slicing the output into strategic views that could be immediately visually
digested and understood by a security advisor to determine if something was
awry in their ecosystem. This program is unique because it analyzes data that the
enterprise already owns, produces results almost immediately after user activity
or incident, and creates a disproportionally large amount of insight compared to
how horizontally short the captured data is.
3 The History and Evolution White and Blacklists
The vast number of programs that enter the market on a monthly basis, make
it difficult to classify programs as either white or black. Whitelisting theory is
succinctly defined by comparing it to Apple’s application store and how they
created an environment where only approved applications are allowed into their
marketplace. For example, Apple has made it very difficult for a user to use a
ringtone from a non-iTunes website because the iPhone’s settings direct the user
to iTunes to download ringtones. Physical security also adopts the whitelisting
philosophy in that most workplaces that require a magnetic badge to enter the
building.
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Even though whitelisting philosophies are already well established, some ex-
perts like including Marcus Ranum have argued that whitelists will continue
to become an increasingly important part of enterprise security as technology
evolves [3]. Whitelists are the foundation of most company issued computers as
they are set up to only allow one employee to access the computer and certain
applications within [2]. Ranum’s point hinges on the fact that companies will be-
gin to pay more attention to how their hardware is used. Companies should have
a better understanding of the programs and destinations that their employees
need to use as a function of their job [3].
For the most part, a blacklist has applications and programs that are known
to be malicious after an exploit has been found. Blacklists can also incorporate
programs that an enterprise does not deem particularly compromising, but rather
just counterproductive to work, like Netflix or computer games. Once discovered,
the item will be placed in the blacklist to prevent the operator from accidentally
or intentionally accessing it. Blacklisting, therefore, has been used as a reactive
approach to security, as the list can only be curated after a harmful impact is
experienced.
Table 1. Advantages [5]
BlacklistAdvantages WhitelistAdvantages
Easy to manage More secure
Easy to install More accurate
Can download updates quickly Minimizes false positives
Can be created at various levels within the enterprise
Easy to customize
Table 2. Disadvantages [5]
BlacklistDisadvantages WhitelistDisadvantages
Exponential growth More time to manage
Many false positives, potentially denying access Requires additional time to install
Continual updates are required
Hard to switch to whitelisting
Potential Vulnerabilities of White and Blacklist. Regardless of either or a
combination of the protocols has been adopted, a concern is that hackers have be-
come familiar with the logic behind whitelists and blacklists. Listing is not new,
and the contents of these lists are far from anonymous or proprietary, as third
parties such as Alexa have published whitelists to promote more open source
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development. A published whitelist in the wrong hands can be like a shopping
list to create a trojan program, because the enterprise is essentially declaring
which programs are likely to remain un-investigated. Cerber ransomware thrives
in this blindspot, as the initial exploit often adopts the alias of a whitelisted
program, such as an updater, to use as vehicle to the machine. Cerber then
works to encrypt the hosts machine’s data and demands money in exchange for
access to a data owner’s files. Xavier Mertens posted an instructional procedure
on how a potential attacker can use published whitelists in order to spoof a DNS
to host malicious scripts; target users, subsequently, unknowingly download and
infect their organizations after initial infection [10]. In blacklisting, if a software
is prematurely blacklisted without proper due diligence, it could clog results by
generating of tons false positives, and therefore obstructing a security analyst
view from actual threats.
4 Cost of a Breach
The cost of a data breach can be substantial depending on the size of the orga-
nization, which is why our agile visualization solution has utility. The Ponemon
Institute and IBM did a study on the cost of a data breach for a sample of orga-
nizations across several countries and the average cost of a data breach was 3.62
million dollars per breach in 2017 [6]. There are several factors that contribute to
the total cost, including amount of records per breach, type of industry, and even
the country in which the company is located. The cost of a breach is something
that must be considered when allocating cost to data security.
The main contributing factors to the total cost of a data breach are more than
just the potential loss incurred by the sale of stolen data. The industry that a
company resides in is the first thing to consider as a business leader. The health
industry leads the market with a cost of $380.00 per breached record where
the global average is $141.00 for FY 2017. The financial and services industries
follow with a per capita (record) cost of $245.00 and $223.00 respectively [6].
These figures can be attributed to the nature of the businesses listed as each of
these have a unique advantage for individuals that seek to compromise consumer
data, such as the breadth and detail of personal information that is contained
in health records, financial account information from the financial firms, and an
opportunistic compromise for quick financial gain from the services industry.
The most common root cause of a data breach is that of a malicious or
criminal attack. These kinds of attacks account for about 50% of the sampled
breaches for FY 2017. Some of the main contributors to increasing the cost on
a per capita basis are third party involvement, extensive cloud migration and
compliance failures which together can increase the average cost of each record
in breach from $141.00 to $183.40 which is a 23% increase [6].
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Fig. 1. Total Cost by Size of the Breach [6]
5 Ethics
Whenever the monitoring of user activity is involved, ethics inevitably comes
into question. To respond to the dilemma, we make note that the cost of a
breach for a company can easily reach a bankrupting amount depending on the
enterprise. Smaller enterprises are particularly vulnerable because the amount
of revenue they generate does not always scale with their amount of data and
Intellectual Property (IP). Self-preservation is one of the moral criterion that is
used to address ethical concerns. If failure to monitor their endpoints results in
the end of the enterprise, then they are morally obligated to do so; otherwise
they would not exist long enough to have a moral dilemma.
In philosophy, there are a number of doctrines that support this, the first
originating as far back as Aristotle and known as “teleology”. This can be briefly
summarized as: the ends justify the means [16]. Even though this is a moral
doctrine, in a contemporary sense this mindset is not highly regarded. However,
using “consequentialism,” a subset of teleology, we can evaluate the magnitude
inaction [15], in this case an enterprise not monitoring it’s own data and de facto
consenting to a breach, against the means of obtaining data to determine a moral
path. As detailed in Section 4, the high cost of a breach, in legal notifications
and loss of intellectual property, clearly leans towards action with regards to
security monitoring.
The harshness of the above concept is ameliorated when dissecting the moral
weight of the “means” in this equation. Most companies have something to the
effect of a Use of Company Resources directive, which loosely states that any
activity conducted on an enterprise owned device is the property of the enter-
prise. Onboarding employees generally have to acknowledge that their employer
owns the data. Even if it could be argued, that prior to the employee’s agree-
ment, the data on the endpoints belonged to each respective employee, US Code
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affirms that entering into an employer agreement with these stipulations effectu-
ally operates as “voluntary disclosure” as it is “lawful consent of the originator”
[17].
The solution only monitors activity on devices that an enterprise has knowl-
edge of because they financed them, so the assumption that user activity is
being monitored is already there and it is operating on data that the enterprise
already owns. Insight just merely makes the collection of this activity actually
have utility.
Lastly, the solution is not a tool to castigate employees by performing ma-
licious activity because such activity often occurs unknowingly. No single tool,
even a cybersecurity one, should be the judge, jury, and executioner on HR re-
lated matters. Insight seeks to clarify the nature of an endpoint ecosystem and
turn information into knowledge. Armed with that advantage, an enterprise can
utilize the more contemporary approaches to cybersecurity which involve educa-
tion, faster reaction, and heightened communication and cooperation [11]. Data
has surpassed oil as the world’s most valuable resource [14], and it is ethically
intuitive to take measures to protect it.
6 Relevant Preexisting Work
To ensure that our research had unique ground, we needed to gain a pulse of
what preexisting work has occurred on topics in this space. Security Information
and Event Management (SIEM) has been around since the early days of the
personal computer revolution. Older companies may have implemented a SIEM
infrastructure but have failed to keep up with modern threats and capabilities
that are currently available to the market. In contrast, some firms see the value
in SIEM implementations and are struggling to balance available resources and
to meet an effective standard. Factors determining the level of implementation
include the companys industry, size, and budget. Because threats and technology
are constantly changing, keeping up with millions of event logs and identified
threats can become expensive in a short amount of time.
Our concept creates a leaner SIEM inspired tool that generates a compre-
hensive report at that can still be interpreted on a high level. As we know, the
personnel responsible for reviewing IOC’s or threat detections must sift through
vast amounts of event logs. Daily log records can be in the millions per day
depending on the size of the company and it can be overwhelming despite the
fact that indicators are a smaller portion of all of the records. Vendors such as
ArcSight, LogRythm, Syslog NG, and Splunk have attempted to negotiate these
problems while capitalizing on their awareness of challenges facing the industry.
Their main offerings are scalability, investigative services and real time threat
protection and correlation [8].
Even still, IT leaders are challenged when tasked to report his or her findings
to the executive team by showing dense logs that leave the audience with more
questions than answers. One of the many focuses of these SIEM tool vendors
is that they make event logging and tracking easier and each claim to have a
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unique algorithm that promises to be superior to their competitors. These are
arguably valid directions; however, we prefer a more Occam’s razor mentality in
our solution; whereas, the complex and obscure algorithm you using to detect
your threats are more likely to find a more obscure and less critical threats.
Similar work, in our case, does not only take the form of pre-packaged ap-
plications. There are also published datasets on SIEM logs like the Unified Host
and Network Dataset found through AZSecure.org, which led to a master data
source on the Los Alamos National Laboratorys government website. The data
was collected from LANL’s enterprise network of Windows machines and the
data itself is reminiscent to information that Insight provides. The main reason
why Insight ’s data is preferable for this project is that CPU usage is more versa-
tile for use in logging employee productivity as a whole, whereas packet counts
are more helpful for logging network focused activity. Because Insight provides
CPU usage data while the LANL set provides packet counts[9], it is evident that
the Los Alamos data set is more network biased while our analysis is more end-
point focused. This LANL dataset is currently the industry model and is heavily
saturated within the aforementioned SIEM vendors’ scopes of services.
Network data will often show the method of an attack but the actual result
that needs to be addressed is entirely encompassed in endpoint data. Even still,
network data will not address security incidents created by user error, careless-
ness, or an inside job. Although the endpoint data we collected is classifiable
as “big data”, network data is multiplicatively more daunting in mass, which
can be attested by any user who has ever run a Wireshark session. After cap-
turing network data, it still needs to be heavily cleaned due to the number of
noisy outside influences from anywhere from the internet service provider to
conflicting network protocols, designating endpoint data as preferable as a more
concentrated source of intelligence.
Finally, there are published guidelines that can be used to comprehensibly
build and implement a successful SIEM program. The National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) provides guidance on how to create and maintain a
secure log management infrastructure [7]. Most of the vendors mentioned above
disclose that their implementations are NIST compliant. NIST is a well-known
organization for standards and practices especially because NIST compliance is
mandatory for federal firms. NIST is a great resource for startup companies that
are establishing a cybersecurity infrastructure from the ground up. NIST also
acknowledges the limits of log management in that there is a massive amount of
data and the difficulty and cost of a highly effective implementation [7]. SIEM
can be used to monitor security threats from internal/external actors, policy,
productivity, and resource utilization. For these reasons there is quite a bit of
research done on the topic, however it is challenging to find research that meets
the unique needs of every enterprise. Our Insight solution takes advantage of
this lack of conclusive research by using the beta to curate our own datasets
without preexisting biases.
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7 Data Gathering
“If I had an hour to solve a problem solution. I would spend the first fifty
minutes determining how to. . . Frame the problem. . . for once I know the proper
question to ask, I can solve the problem in less than five minutes” -an Albert
Einstein quote hijacked from a User Experience (UX) advocacy groups twitter
feed. This mentality embodies the following section and can help explain why it
is so specifically detailed. The utility of Insight is equal parts UX with analytics
and the way that the raw data is handled initially decided what options are
available to us in our solution. Our impression after the data gathering step was
that we should be overly cautious and deliberate as to not alienate any possible
solutions. Munging is also the period where you become intimately familiar with
the dataset, gaining invaluable domain knowledge while tangling your fingers in
it to see what bites.
The first challenge was gathering the dummy data we needed to understand
how future endpoint data could be aggregated and then visualized. We accom-
plished this by convenience sampling five different work stations at random in-
tervals ranging from days to months. We locally appended the feeds from our
different work stations together to get a base set of commands. These com-
mands were abstracted to automate the data collection process in the future
central cloud server implementation. During the munging step, we created an
upload vector so we could still access each initial sub data feed directly. We also
created the percent CPU vector to quickly denote later on if a specific program
was overburdening the system in comparison to its colleagues in the same time
interval. Lastly, we casted all vectors, that were initially read in as factors, as
dates, times, integers, and character types respectively. Most commands ran rel-
atively quickly until we had to do heavier manipulation of the data, in which we
had to employ Graphic Processing Unit (“GPU”) computing.
After capturing our full dummy dataset, we parsed it to create three databases.
The first just identifies the end user, the time, and their total CPU usage across
all programs at that time. This set is used to level set assumptions of what
normal CPU usage is, so spikes can be defined as a possible IOC. The second
database takes the long data feed initially generated by Insight and aggregates
it in a wide format. The main difference is that instead of iterating each time
a program is alive in a heartbeat fashion, the aggregated database takes each
program and gives it a start and an end time. Since the data was aggregated, our
previous vectors of program CPU usage, percent CPU usage, and average total
CPU usage were averaged. We took specific error handling precautions to make
sure that if a program started, stopped, and restarted again, that the programs
start and end time were not misrepresented by denoting the first time it ever
started for the user and the last time it was ended by the user. This was achieved
by creating an instance vector, that was tuned to the intervals the Insight pro-
gram had originally pulsed to query the active programs. Lastly, we created our
affectionately labeled golden index database that had every single software in-
stance with their respective stats unmanipulated and every single vector that
was created during data munging as reference, spanning thirteen vectors, close
10
SMU Data Science Review, Vol. 1 [2018], No. 4, Art. 5
https://scholar.smu.edu/datasciencereview/vol1/iss4/5
to thirty million records, and approximately three gigabytes. It was at this point
we realized that the final data warehousing solution for Insight would be a cloud
based relational database.
8 Baselining
In order to demonstrate what is abnormal, we had to run summary statistics
off of our current databases. The most accessible method is looking at the total
CPU usage of a machine. Below we can determine that the average CPU usage
for our sample is approximately .17 with a heavy number of outliers occurring
between .6 and 1. We additionally explored this average by determining what was
normal by each program. For example, if dwm.exe, which is typically run by the
owner Windows Manager/DWM-1 owner is registering as using .4 CPU, when
the running average is .003, then that should be considered unusual activity.
Fig. 2. Total CPU Across All Programs and Users
However, these results can be skewed by sleep time as can be seen in Fig.
3. It is normal for a CPU utilization to taper off during periods of inactivity
prior to sleeping, so depending how many times a user abandons their computer
without shutting down, average CPU usage could be skewed.
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Fig. 3. Total CPU Over Time
We tackled this concern by conducting a randomized sleep study to deter-
mine the threshold of when a decrease in Total CPU power might indicate user
inactivity. We monitored our recorded Total CPU in three different intervals and
randomized periods of time to determine what would be the average Total CPU
usage during periods of known inactivity and activity (Fig. 4). We used these re-
sults to normalize our data so we could decipher our data collection outputs and
segregate out inactivity periods of noise. These results can also be repurposed
from a workplace planning perspective because it attributes concrete numbers
to a period where an employee is perhaps physically present, but not performing
computing work.
12
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Fig. 4. Endpoint Sleep Study Results
9 Data Simulation
After we developed our initial data structure we had to engage in heavy sampling
to be able to make it more realistic to demo our use cases. The underlying issue
is we are trying to model an enterprise environment and we only have five data
feeds. We determined that we needed at least 50 endpoints to simulate a small
company, with the assumption that all of our visualizations need to be abstracted
and scalable for enterprises with thousands of employees, while staying true to
our operating criterion that the visualization cannot become too cluttered and
still be able to clearly depict possible concerns when needed. Generally sampling
is used to create a smaller subset of data that is still representative of a popula-
tion. We flip that concept on its head by using our smaller data and randomly
sampling within it to create more users. To ensure that our resulting simulation
data is realistic, we first stratified the data based on the average number of pro-
gram instances that occurred each day, taking into account the natural variance
of data occurring on weekends as opposed to weekdays. The stratification of pro-
gram instances by weekday vs weekend is our Primary Sampling Unit (PSU).
13
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The average number of program instances run overall was 2231. However, the
average for the weekdays was 2431 and the average for the weekends was 1172.
Table 3.
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
3419 3379 1989 3121 1642 25 3518
6787 4581 2476 4412 2662 475 240
2485 628 660 3846 782 1165 142
4018 1429 1152 3325 1027 2639
614 1928 945 1645
2948 2003 142 5847
Secondarily we had to employ a Secondary Sampling Unit (SSU) of cluster-
ing by Owner. Before we had collected any data, we assumed that the owner
would just be the name of the user we were gathering data from. We soon came
to realize that each user generates data belonging to a system owner during
their daily activity. To ensure our simulation data was realistic, we ensured that
our randomly generated users generated system owner activity at approximate
proportions of as indicated below.
Table 4.
Owner PercentofProgramInstances
Font Driver Host/UMFD-0 0.15%
Font Driver Host/UMFD-1 0.15%
NT AUTHORITY/LOCAL SERVICE 2.17%
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10 Data Pipeline
Fig. 5 outlines our data pipeline that resulted from Sections 7 through 9 and
can be read from left to right. The computer’s to the left symbolize the number
of endpoint machines. Their individual logs are harvested and then processed
and tagged (gears) to ensure that the data remains traceable to the machine for
the duration of of the pipeline. The revised data is then collected in a central
cloud location. Once there, the data is aggregated and appended to reference
tables such as employee rosters or IP to geographic location mapping tables.
The data is then manipulated (star) and sliced into custom tables that feed into
each visualization. This method allows for whatever language the visualization
is written in to not be overburdened with data and have custom recalculated
coordinate locations to improve the visualization’s performance.
Fig. 5. Data Architecture
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11 Insight Visualization Results
Below are the different visualizations that we wish to showcase to a Security
Analyst so they can quickly obtain an understanding of how their healthy their
enterprise is performing without being inundated and overwhelmed by the vol-
ume of their data. The topics we cover are the three major branches of cyberse-
curity: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Performance; along with ancillary insights
of visualizing Workforce Planning and HR Management. When demoed, these
topics are showcased with two visualizations per topic, what the output would
look like in a normal situation and what the output would look like in a situation
with high IOC or areas of concern.
First, we wanted to give the IT advisor a quick glance at the health of their
overall IT environment. The below visualization borrows from our rice metaphor
(Fig. 6). Each cluster represents an end point and those with higher blacklist
and IOC scores rise to the top. The IT advisor can still see primarily whitelist
activity users if they have a curiosity for it by scrolling down, but they are not
directed to them initially. If the results of the below diagram are within their
predetermined threshold for normal, they can stop investigating after viewing
this plot.
Fig. 6. Rice Diagram
Furthermore, after utilizing the vertical dimension, we wanted to give some
meaning to the horizontal one. Here we decided to organize our plots by highest
CPU usage, with those users who compute more populating on the right side(Fig.
7). This way the security analyst can immediately focus on users with that have
the highest threat and are performing the most activity, which would logically
spread their threat faster.
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Fig. 7. Rice Diagram Full
Secondly, we wanted to allow the IT advisor to see the entire program pop-
ulation of their environment. To accomplish this, we created a more interactive
visualization that can be moved and zoomed. This plot borrows from commu-
nication visualizations that incorporate the concept of nodes and edges (Fig.
8). The node is either a whitelist, blacklist, IOC program, and the edges would
be each individual program in that category. The result naturally separates the
programs into different clusters denoted clearly by color. We labeled it “Sinew”
because each node can be stretched and moved in an organic motion.
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Fig. 8. Sinew Diagram
Zooming into a particular node, as Fig. 9 depicts, will give you a breakdown
of the programs in that category. Edges that are closer to the nexus are placed
in that manner because they have higher CPU utilization and are therefore more
relevant. This strategically places more relevant programs closer to the nexus to
be noticed as they can be also investigated for performance concerns along with
their security categorization.
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Fig. 9. Sinew Zoomed
Another method of employed the community network graph is by our visu-
alization affectionately labeled Liable(Fig. 10). This graph seeks to create a link
between Rice and Sinew so you know which users are culpable or not of creating
malicious activity. There is a dropdown where you can search for either Blacklist,
Whitelist, or IOC types of programs and see each user sized by the time they
spend using that category of program to create a sense of accountability in your
IT Environment.
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Fig. 10. Liable
We also incorporated two workforce planning visualizations. The first “Day-
light,” quickly shows the analyst when his users are active. Fig. 11 shows the
progression of each of the three views. By leveraging alpha components of colors,
the first view on the left shows you your entire employee population’s schedule
in unison. More transparent areas indicate that less users are active at that time.
The visualization moves to progress to the right block where you can see each
employee’s working time individually. The notion draws from a basic pie graph,
where a full circle would equal twenty four hours. The left side of the x axis
indicates 6am and slices ending on the right side of the x axis indicate that they
stopped working at 6pm. The visualization can be changed to either show the
time as recorded on the machine, so the analyst would just see whether his em-
ployees are active in the day or night, or account for time zones if they wanted
to investigate what users were active during the true time of a security incident.
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Fig. 11. Daylight
Our second workforce planning animation delves into the employee’s location.
The top map plot shows the clusters of employees clearly with a circle that
augments based on how many employees are in each location. It would be able
to clearly denote if a company has a more east coast or west coast culture or
give a quick pulse of where employees are during a crisis.
The migration view of “Diaspora,” focuses on just the subset of employees
that move during a period of time. If there were a lot of connections, it would
be insightful for revising travel policies. Also, if an employee crosses a border,
compliance an HR professionals would have a method of following up on whether
proper immigration, export compliance, or contractual obligations were satisfied
during the employee’s movement.
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Fig. 12. Diaspora
12 Visualization Theory
When deciding how to visualize our results, we borrowed a lot from marketing
theory. There is a reason why marketing materials are constantly changing their
approach, syntax, color scheme, format, etc. We technically could present every
visualization in the form of a line graph, but redundantly formatted information
is often glazed over and the nuances that the visualization is trying to convey
remains unnoticed. For this Insight utilization case, trying to convey the health
of a network, we had to make sure that each topic/assertion was presented in
a different way so the end user would mentally categorize them as unique, but
individually important pieces of information. This was particularly challenging
for our topic because there were many vectors that our data gathering process
records that we did not want to oversimplify by not including them. However,
an over ambitious visualization, as can see below, captures a majority of the
vectors, but ends up confounding the problem and voices no message. Therefore,
we had to be strategic in splitting our analyses into multiple visualizations with
clear coherent thoughts/use cases.
We also had to take into consideration who our audience was. The primary
user would be the security analyst at an enterprise, but we wanted them to
be able to utilize the same tool to both investigate their environment as well
as demonstrate it. To satisfy this need, each visualization was created to be
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Fig. 13. Failed Visualization
scalable and demonstrate both high and low level information in an intuitive
manner; generally, by scrolling inward or outward. This allowed for there to be
an uninterrupted stream of communication across the hierarchy of a company.
This method also reduced the number of visualizations needed to pull together to
convey a thought, because each was overloaded with multiple comparisons. We
also wanted to make the visualizations entertaining and unique from each other,
so that the cognitive classification of the information would be pre-designated
for the consumer.
Lastly, we took into account the common failures of dashboard design, pri-
marily those that relay on a hyper dependence of software [12]. There is a com-
mon misconception that advanced software will also handle the design and com-
munication for you. Designers can fall into their own marketing traps that focus
on flashy software that may dazzle or entertain a viewer, but provide no inher-
ent value. We made sure to split our visualizations across multiple tools and
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languages, some of them very primitive, so we were only emoting and commu-
nicating precisely what we intended and nothing more.
13 Analysis
The resulting Insight solution addresses cybersecurity concerns for enterprises
from an endpoint level. The number of endpoints in an enterprise can vary
greatly, but since each implementation will only be directed at a singular enter-
prise, there is a lot of homogeneity in the overall data to be capitalized from. By
using endpoint data, we demystify cybersecurity analysis by interpreting basic
values that most users already understand. The accessibility of Insight is the
most crucial component because it allows executives, who can pivot and real-
locate resources for a concern, to be informed enough to make those decisions.
Although the input vectors into Insight are not intricate, the ability to under-
stand what is normal and determine and diagnose an outlier is undeniably an
effective method of predicting a change in performance. A security incident can
be most succinctly characterized as just that, a change. There will never be a
singular correct answer to the exact correct CPU utilization across all enter-
prises, the number of programs they should be allowing, or even the types of
programs that are acceptable, but enabling enterprises to unveil what their op-
timal definition of normal is, provides both reactive and predictive solutions for
enterprise cybersecurity.
14 Conclusion
Data science is considered to be a hybrid of four major topics: Statistics, Pro-
gramming, Domain Knowledge, and Visualization. While the utility of the three
are intuitive, because you cannot gather, ingest and analyze big data without
them, the last is where the true value of the Insight software is found. One of
our professors is loosely quoted to state: “If you can’t communicate an idea, you
don’t have one.” Visualization is essentially the too long didn’t read (TL;DR) of
big data. Considering the cost of a breach average more than $140 per record,
and the number of records held by a company infinitely increasing. Enterprises
no longer have the luxury of not knowing what is happening on in their systems.
Insight drastically reduces the administrative burden gauging the health of en-
terprise end points by visually communicating Indicators of Compromise in an
unambiguous manner.
The resulting visualizations were designed to be easily interpretable at higher
levels of the organization yet contain enough information to satisfy those with
more domain knowledge. This framework is adaptable and can be adjusted to
visualize the data for high level anomaly detection or it can be scaled down
to a lower level that helps identify minor discrepancies for subject matter ex-
perts. As a result the visualizations are regressive, ensuring that we didn’t have
a large breadth of visualizations that could be encumbering to a user, but rather
a curated list of views that only exist for the most critical use cases. Lastly,
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the visualizations as a package offer additive insights, when combined in unison
and allow the analyst or executive direction in exploring their overall IT in-
frastructure. By adopting this mantra, we can conclude that visualization is an
incredible tool for reporting and communicating large amounts of information to
a diverse crowd. Looking forward, we can use the information from the analysis
to recommend optimizations to the Insight application such recategorizations of
IOC programs as either whitelist or blacklist depending on how their metadata
correlates with programs in either categories. Additionally, a single, interactive
dashboard can be implemented after testing and receiving adequate feedback.
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